Optimal dynamic matching

DOI10.3982/TE3740MaRDI QIDQ4991720zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mariagiovanna Baccara, Sangmok Lee, Leeat Yariv

Publication date 3 June 2021

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3740

zbMATH Keywords

child adoptiondynamic matchingmarket designmechanism designorgan donation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
• On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
• Dynamic matching with a fall-back option
• Dynamic stochastic matching under limited time
• Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities

Cited in

(32)

• Competitively sustainable matching plans with discounting
• Stable secretaries
• Gradual college admission
• Dynamic matching with teams
• Bipartite choices
• Optimal market thickness
• Optimal matching of random parts
• Reward maximization in general dynamic matching systems
• Task allocation and on-the-job training
• Sequential entry in one-to-one matching markets
• Dynamic matching with a fall-back option
• Optimal search, learning and implementation
• Profit-maximizing matchmaker
• Optimal Matching and Empirical Measures
• Opting into optimal matchings
• Optimal Pairings
• Matching while learning
• On the optimal design of a bipartite matching queueing system
• Asymptotically Optimal Control of a Centralized Dynamic Matching Market with General Utilities
• Dynamic stochastic matching under limited time
• On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
• Dynamic Matching Algorithms in Practice
• Dynamically stable matching
• When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
• Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets
• Dynamic matching with transfers
• Optimal queue to minimize waste
• Quick or cheap? Breaking points in dynamic markets
• Unpaired kidney exchange: overcoming double coincidence of wants without money
• Optimal allocation via waitlists: simplicity through information design
• On the efficiency of queueing in dynamic matching markets
• Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms

This page was built for publication: Optimal dynamic matching

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4991720)