Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms

DOI10.3982/TE5419MaRDI QIDQ7011917zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Julien Combe, Vladyslav Nora, Olivier Tercieux

Publication date 18 March 2025

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/TE5419

zbMATH Keywords

course allocationdynamic matchingmarket design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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• Assignment problems with complementarities
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• Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4089320 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive compatibility of large centralized matching markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Multiagent mechanism design without money
• On matching and thickness in heterogeneous dynamic markets
• Optimal assignment of durable objects to successive agents
• Optimal dynamic matching
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• The mass transfer approach to multivariate discrete first order stochastic dominance: direct proof and implications
• The package assignment model.
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

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