Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
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(60)- Dynamic communication with biased senders
- An experimental study of voting with costly delay
- Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types
- Cooperation dynamics in repeated games of adverse selection
- Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Efficient voting with penalties
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Balanced voting
- A note on linked bargaining
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- All or nothing: state capacity and optimal public goods provision
- Persuasion with limited communication capacity
- Democracy undone. Systematic minority advantage in competitive vote markets
- Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
- From equals to despots: the dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information
- Consensus and common knowledge of an aggregate of decisions
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Issue linkage
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Discounted quotas
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
- Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games
- Efficient chip strategies in repeated games
- From monetary to nonmonetary mechanism design via artificial currencies
- On the Futility of Dynamics in Robust Mechanism Design
- Dynamic double auctions: toward first best
- Multiagent mechanism design without money
- One man, one bid
- Taking turns
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Prior‐free dynamic allocation under limited liability
- Dynamic delegation with a persistent state
- A simple mechanism for resolving conflict
- Corrigendum to: ``Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Role of linking mechanisms in multitask agency with hidden information
- Comment on Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) “Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions”
- Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects
- Critical decisions and constitutional rules
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- A self-contained karma economy for the dynamic allocation of common resources
- Shannon meets Myerson: information extraction from a strategic sender
- Equilibria and group welfare in vote trading systems
- Marginal reputation
- Screening for breakthroughs
- Queueing to learn
- Dynamic assignment without money: optimality of spot mechanisms
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Repeated delegation
- Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
- Efficient compromising
- An experimental study of storable votes
- Comparative cheap talk
- Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement
- All in good time
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
- Task scheduling and moral hazard
- Minority voting and long-term decisions
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