Efficient compromising

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.01.011MaRDI QIDQ840684zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tilman Börgers, Peter Postl

Publication date 14 September 2009

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://opus.bath.ac.uk/31974/1/Postl_J_Economic_Theory_2009_144_5.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

arbitrationcompromisemechanism design without transferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof compromises
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
• Efficiency and compromise: a bid-offer-counteroffer mechanism with two players
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules

Cites work

• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
• Inefficiencies on linking decisions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Pollution claim settlements under private information
• Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
• Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games

Cited in

(15)

• Selecting a winner with external referees
• Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
• The winner‐take‐all dilemma
• Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
• A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
• Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
• A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information
• A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
• Bargaining through approval
• Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
• Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

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