Efficient compromising
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Publication:840684
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2009.01.011zbMATH Open1195.91032OpenAlexW4230096383MaRDI QIDQ840684FDOQ840684
Authors: Tilman Börgers, Peter Postl 
Publication date: 14 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/31974/1/Postl_J_Economic_Theory_2009_144_5.pdf
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Cites Work
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
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- Pollution claim settlements under private information
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
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- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Public-Good Provision with Many Participants
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
- Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
- Strategy-proof cardinal decision schemes
- Inefficiencies on linking decisions
- Undominated strategies and coordination in normalform games
Cited In (15)
- The winner‐take‐all dilemma
- Equilibrium and effectiveness of two-parameter scoring rules
- Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
- A general impossibility theorem on Pareto efficiency and Bayesian incentive compatibility
- Efficient performance in two agent bargaining
- A theory of sticky rents: search and bargaining with incomplete information
- A `divide and choose' approach to compromising
- Bargaining through approval
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions
- Continuity and incentive compatibility in cardinal mechanisms
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Selecting a winner with external referees
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