Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach

DOI10.2307/2938181MaRDI QIDQ3974418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kim C. Border

Publication date 25 June 1992

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/243525265c01f61a8c3269408b32872d07b9fa0f

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatible direct auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• Asymmetric reduced form auctions
• Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
• A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming
• On vector formulations of auction-type problems with applications
• Winner determination in geometrical combinatorial auctions
• The polyhedral geometry of truthful auctions

Cited in

(26)

• A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
• Optimization and mechanism design
• Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
• Selling to multiple no-regret buyers
• On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
• Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
• Efficient compromising
• Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
• Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss
• Efficient computation of optimal auctions via reduced forms
• Who wants to be an auctioneer?
• Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
• Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
• Reduced form auctions revisited
• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
• A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises
• Symmetric reduced-form voting
• Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
• Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
• Asymmetric reduced form auctions
• Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
• Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
• Alea iacta est: auctions, persuasion, interim rules, and dice

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