Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach
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Publication:3974418
DOI10.2307/2938181zbMATH Open0754.90018OpenAlexW1987268633MaRDI QIDQ3974418FDOQ3974418
Authors: Kim C. Border 
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/243525265c01f61a8c3269408b32872d07b9fa0f
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Cited In (27)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Optimization and mechanism design
- Symmetric reduced-form voting
- Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
- An Extension to the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions
- Efficient compromising
- Selling to multiple no-regret buyers
- Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms
- Welfare-preserving \(\varepsilon \)-BIC to BIC transformation with negligible revenue loss
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Algorithmic Bayesian Persuasion
- Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
- A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises
- Asymmetric reduced form auctions
- Cardinal Bayesian allocation mechanisms without transfers
- Reduced form auctions revisited
- Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
- Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives
- Persuasion and incentives through the lens of duality
- Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
- A note on optimal allocation with costly verification
- Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
- Mechanism design with budget constraints and a population of agents
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