Efficient mechanisms with information acquisition
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Publication:2419598
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2019.04.010zbMath1410.91249OpenAlexW3124320547WikidataQ127945252 ScholiaQ127945252MaRDI QIDQ2419598
Publication date: 14 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://economics.sas.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/filevault/Yunan%20062017%20SSRN%2016_007%20v.2.pdf
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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Cites Work
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