Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
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Publication:6170030
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102851zbMath1521.91123MaRDI QIDQ6170030
Xin Feng, Murali Agastya, Jingfeng Lu
Publication date: 15 August 2023
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
revenue maximizationoptimal auctionscovert information acquisitionendogenous market sizeexclusive bidding
Cites Work
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- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
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- Competition for Procurement Contracts and Underinvestment
- Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
- Optimal Auction Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
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