Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
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Publication:864895
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.004zbMATH Open1154.91419OpenAlexW2071854262MaRDI QIDQ864895FDOQ864895
Authors: Lixin Ye 
Publication date: 13 February 2007
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auctions with entry
- Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
- Optimal Auction Design
- Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Optimal auctions revisited
- A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
- A model of rational competitive bidding
Cited In (30)
- Auctions with entry and resale
- Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
- Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
- Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
- Auctions with selective entry
- A class of two-stage distributionally robust games
- Gender effects in private value auctions
- Optimal auctions with information acquisition
- Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
- Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
- Pre-contest communication incentives
- On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
- I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
- A pre-emption model of mergers
- Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
- Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
- Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
- Sequential information disclosure in auctions
- Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
- A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
- Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
- Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
- Risky procurement with an insider bidder
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
- Blind portfolios' auctions in two-rounds
- OPTIMAL TIMING AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE FOR SOE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
- A sequential auction-bargaining procurement model
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
- Two results on auctions with endogenous entry
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