Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions

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Publication:864895

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004zbMath1154.91419OpenAlexW2071854262MaRDI QIDQ864895

Lixin Ye

Publication date: 13 February 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004



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