Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.12.004MaRDI QIDQ864895zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lixin Ye

Publication date 13 February 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsefficient entryindicative biddingtwo-stage auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A model of rational competitive bidding
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Auctions with entry
• Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auctions revisited

Cited in

(30)

• Auctions with entry and resale
• Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
• Efficient investment in a dynamic auction environment
• Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions
• Auctions with selective entry
• A class of two-stage distributionally robust games
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition
• Gender effects in private value auctions
• Auction-lottery hybrid mechanisms: structural model and empirical analysis
• Auction design with shortlisting when value discovery is covert
• Pre-contest communication incentives
• On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
• A pre-emption model of mergers
• I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions
• Identification and estimation of risk aversion in first-price auctions with unobserved auction heterogeneity
• Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Sequential information disclosure in auctions
• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry
• Risky procurement with an insider bidder
• Pre-play communication in procurement auctions: silence is not golden
• Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
• Blind portfolios' auctions in two-rounds
• OPTIMAL TIMING AND EQUILIBRIUM PRICE FOR SOE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION
• Dual sourcing with price discovery
• A sequential auction-bargaining procurement model
• What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
• Two results on auctions with endogenous entry

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