Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
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Publication:480844
DOI10.1007/S00182-013-0405-7zbMATH Open1308.91068OpenAlexW2124648551MaRDI QIDQ480844FDOQ480844
Authors: Ron Lavi, Ella Segev 
Publication date: 12 December 2014
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0405-7
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Cites Work
- Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
- The dynamic pivot mechanism
- An efficient dynamic mechanism
- Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce
- Optimal dynamic auctions for revenue management
- Optimal dynamic auctions and simple index rules
- Coarse Matching
- Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
- The effectiveness of English auctions.
- Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
- Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
- Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies
- Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions
- Auctions with dynamic populations: efficiency and revenue maximization
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