Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment

DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0545-YMaRDI QIDQ663187zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gustavo E. Rodriguez

Publication date 14 February 2012

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0545-y

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsequential auctionsdeclining price anomalyimperfect commitment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

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• Sequentially optimal auctions
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• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices
• On second-price auctions and imperfect competition.

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
• Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
• Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply
• Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
• Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• More on phantom bidding
• Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• The multiple unit auction with variable supply
• Using and abusing economic theory

Cited in

(9)

• Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
• Two ways to auction off an uncertain good
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
• Sequential auctions with ambiguity
• Sequential procurement auctions with risk-averse suppliers
• First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders
• Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation
• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices

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