Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2003.11.002MaRDI QIDQ1877158zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bernard Caillaud, Claudio Mezzetti

Publication date 16 August 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.002

zbMATH Keywords

ParticipationRatchet effectRepeated auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• Reserve prices eliminate low revenue equilibria in uniform price auctions
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A two stage sequential auction with multi-unit demands
• Bottom-fishing and declining prices in sequential auctions
• Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities
• Econometrics of First-Price Auctions
• Equilibrium price paths in sequential auctions with stochastic supply
• Game theory
• Optimal Auction Design
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• Reserve prices without commitment
• Sequential auctions of endogenously valued objects
• Sequential auctions of stochastically equivalent objects
• Sequentially optimal auctions
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The declining price anomaly

Cited in

(20)

• Ordering sellers in sequential auctions
• An equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction
• Reserve prices in a dynamic auction when bidders are capacity-constrained
• Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders
• Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
• Reserve prices in repeated auctions
• Partial pooling at the reserve price in auctions with resale opportunities
• A note on sequential auctions with multi-unit demand
• A comparative analysis of multi-unit sequential auction under optimal reserve
• Sequential auctions with imperfect quantity commitment
• Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
• Dynamic price discrimination with customer recognition
• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
• First-price equilibrium and revenue equivalence in a sequential procurement auction model
• A note on the dynamics of incentive contracts
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Signal jamming in a sequential auction
• Sequential auctions with decreasing reserve prices
• Properties of bid and ask reservation prices in the rank-dependent expected utility model
• Imperfect competition in online auctions

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