| Publication | Date of Publication | Type |
|---|
Contracting over persistent information
Theoretical Economics | 2024-07-02 | Paper |
Shuttle diplomacy
Journal of Economic Theory | 2024-03-27 | Paper |
When Walras meets Vickrey
Theoretical Economics | 2023-11-02 | Paper |
A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation-based tâtonnement
Theoretical Economics | 2021-11-11 | Paper |
The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 2019-11-21 | Paper |
Repeated Nash implementation
Theoretical Economics | 2018-09-19 | Paper |
Rawlsian distributive justice and rights
Economics Letters | 2016-01-01 | Paper |
Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
Economic Theory | 2014-04-24 | Paper |
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
Journal of Economic Theory | 2012-12-13 | Paper |
Trust-based mechanisms for robust and efficient task allocation in the presence of execution uncertainty
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research | 2009-12-10 | Paper |
Auctions in which losers set the price
Games and Economic Behavior | 2009-07-15 | Paper |
On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 2008-07-11 | Paper |
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions
Games and Economic Behavior | 2008-05-08 | Paper |
Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: surplus extraction
Economic Theory | 2007-04-26 | Paper |
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
Econometrica | 2006-06-16 | Paper |
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
Games and Economic Behavior | 2006-05-29 | Paper |
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games
Games and Economic Behavior | 2005-08-05 | Paper |
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions
Journal of Economic Theory | 2004-08-16 | Paper |
Learning in games by random sampling
Journal of Economic Theory | 2001-07-23 | Paper |
Games with partially enforceable agreements
Games and Economic Behavior | 1999-05-16 | Paper |
Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
Journal of Economic Theory | 1995-02-16 | Paper |
Principals competing for an agent in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard
Journal of Economic Theory | 1994-03-24 | Paper |
The possibility of efficient mechanisms for trading an indivisible object
Journal of Economic Theory | 1993-08-19 | Paper |
INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: A BARGAINING APPROACH
Metroeconomica | 1993-08-17 | Paper |
Paretian efficiency, Rawlsian justice and the Nozick theory of rights
Social Choice and Welfare | 1987-01-01 | Paper |
