Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2447145
DOI10.1007/s00199-013-0751-5zbMath1367.91076OpenAlexW2018820253MaRDI QIDQ2447145
Ottorino Chillemi, Claudio Mezzetti
Publication date: 24 April 2014
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11343/282833
Related Items
Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective, Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud, Credit auctions and bid caps, Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts
Cites Work
- Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
- Biased procurement auctions
- A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening
- Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty
- Bidding up, buying out and cooling-off: An examination of auctions with withdrawal rights
- High bids and broke winners
