Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.04.004zbMath1274.91213OpenAlexW2096997085MaRDI QIDQ380841

Roberto Burguet, Esther Hauk, Juan-José Ganuza

Publication date: 14 November 2013

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000723?np=y

zbMATH Keywords

bankruptcylimited liabilityprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement ⋮ Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard ⋮ Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach ⋮ OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION ⋮ Credit auctions and bid caps ⋮ HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS* ⋮ Limited liability and high bids in English auctions

Cites Work

• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
• High bids and broke winners

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