A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1084MaRDI QIDQ1906702zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Keith Waehrer

Publication date 24 July 1996

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1084

zbMATH Keywords

auction modelewinning bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(13)

• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation
• Credit auctions and bid caps
• Participation and welfare in auctions with default
• Renewable auctions: bidding for real options
• A matter of interpretation: ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages
• Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
• Up-front payment under RD rule
• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud
• High bids and broke winners
• Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk
• Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts

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