Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts
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Publication:1754247
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.028zbMath1403.91166OpenAlexW2769896629MaRDI QIDQ1754247
Luca Di Corato, Michele Moretto, Cesare Dosi
Publication date: 30 May 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.028
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