Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement

DOI10.1007/S00712-013-0352-6zbMATH Open1294.91184OpenAlexW1504699750MaRDI QIDQ403756FDOQ403756

Authors: Chiara D'Alpaos, Michele Moretto, Paola Valbonesi, Sergio Vergalli 

Publication date: 29 August 2014

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/139507/files/NDL2012-078.pdf

Recommendations

• Time of the essence
• Uncertainty in procurement contracting with time incentives
• Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation
• A theory of optimal deadlines
• A model of incentive contracts for just-in-time delivery

zbMATH Keywords

real optionspublic procurementstrategic time overruns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to actuarial sciences and financial mathematics (62P05) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Corporate finance (dividends, real options, etc.) (91G50) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cited In (4)

• How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
• Editorial: The economics of irreversible choices
• Time of the essence
• Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts

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