Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation

DOI10.1111/IERE.12327MaRDI QIDQ4629227zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fabian Herweg, Marco A. Schwarz

Publication date 21 March 2019

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12327

zbMATH Keywords

cost overrunprocurement auctionsrenegotiation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Procurement with cost and noncost attributes: cost-sharing mechanisms
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

Cites work

• A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
• Better, faster, cheaper: an experimental analysis of a multiattribute reverse auction mechanism with restricted information feedback
• Common value auctions with default: An experimental approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

Cited in

(3)

• Total-Cost Procurement Auctions: Impact of Suppliers' Cost Adjustments on Auction Format Choice
• Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement
• Auctioning long-term projects under financial constraints

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