OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION

DOI10.1111/IERE.12327zbMath1419.91328OpenAlexW3121349269MaRDI QIDQ4629227

Marco A. Schwarz, Fabian Herweg

Publication date: 21 March 2019

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12327

zbMATH Keywords

renegotiationprocurement auctionscost overrun

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Common value auctions with default: An experimental approach
• A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages
• Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback
• Optimal Auction Design
• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

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