Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

DOI10.1287/opre.43.6.983zbMath0852.90054OpenAlexW2093929083MaRDI QIDQ4887722

Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf

Publication date: 5 August 1996

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.43.6.983

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium biddingwithdrawal strategiessealed bidswithdrawable bids

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (7)

Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud ⋮ Contests with insurance ⋮ Pricing in multiple-item procurement auctions with a common to all items fixed cost ⋮ Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk ⋮ OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION ⋮ High bids and broke winners

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