Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance
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Publication:4887722
DOI10.1287/OPRE.43.6.983zbMATH Open0852.90054OpenAlexW2093929083MaRDI QIDQ4887722FDOQ4887722
Ronald M. Harstad, Michael H. Rothkopf
Publication date: 5 August 1996
Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.43.6.983
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