Contests with insurance

DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00232-5MaRDI QIDQ2218543zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela

Publication date 15 January 2021

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsinsurancereimbursement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Actuarial mathematics (91G05)

Recommendations

• All-Pay Contests
• Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
• Revenue in contests with many participants
• Effects of risk aversion on all-pay auction with reimbursement
• Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information

Cites work

• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Contest architecture
• Cost sharing under increasing returns: A comparison of simple mechanisms
• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• Manipulations in contests
• Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
• Sad-loser contests
• Sequential two-prize contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Withdrawable Bids as Winner's Curse Insurance

Cited in

(3)

• Effect of reimbursement on all-pay auction
• Winner's optimal reimbursement in contest
• Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information

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