Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2004.00484.XMaRDI QIDQ5473014zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Jacob K. Goeree, Theo Offerman

Publication date 19 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00484.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

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Cited in

(13)

• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
• Auctions with speculators: an experimental study
• Contests with insurance
• Premium auctions in the field
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
• Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?
• Auctions with financial externalities
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Premium auctions and risk preferences: an experimental study
• Auctions
• Asymmetric auctions with resale: an experimental study
• Premium auctions and risk preferences
• Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities

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