Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?

DOI10.1007/S10683-009-9227-7MaRDI QIDQ2379696zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors R. Mark Isaac, Svetlana Pevnitskaya, Timothy C. Salmon

Publication date 19 March 2010

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9227-7

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscharitable givingeconomic experiments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions
• ``Bucket auctions for charity
• Charity auctions for the happy few
• Charity auctions with multiple goods: bidding behavior and revenue
• The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality

Cites work

• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• Charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions
• Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
• Revenue equivalence revisited

Cited in

(5)

• The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
• ``Bucket auctions for charity
• Charitable motives and bidding in charity auctions
• Charity auctions with multiple goods: bidding behavior and revenue
• AUCTIONS FOR CHARITY: THE CURSE OF THE FAMILIAR

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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