Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
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Publication:765216
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.013zbMATH Open1279.91087OpenAlexW2091655127MaRDI QIDQ765216FDOQ765216
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.013
Recommendations
auction designcharity auctioncross shareholdingseffective paymentsfinancial externalitiespayment-coefficient matrix
Cites Work
- Optimal Auction Design
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Notes and Comments the Amsterdam Auction
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Determining damages from the operation of bidding rings: an analysis of the post-auction ``knockout sale.
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (9)
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions
- Matching auction with winner's curse and imperfect financial markets
- Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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