Cross-owned firms competing in auctions

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2004.03.007MaRDI QIDQ2486149zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ottorino Chillemi

Publication date 5 August 2005

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.007

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionMechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Auctions with cross-shareholdings
• Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
• The shill bidding effect versus the linkage principle
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Harmful competition in all-pay auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3204015 (Why is no real title available?)
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(6)

• Auctions with cross-shareholdings
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Similar bidders in takeover contests
• An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
• Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
• Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings

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