Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
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Publication:826040
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Cites work
- Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy
- An externality-robust auction: theory and experimental evidence
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Auctions with financial externalities
- Bargaining and negative externalities
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
- When and why not to auction
Cited in
(10)- Cross-holdings with asymmetric information and technologies
- The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis
- Optimal sale across venues and auctions with a buy-now option
- Optimal sales to users who hold inventory
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings
- Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
- Cross-Selling Lending and Underwriting: Scope Economies and Incentives*
- Cross-owned firms competing in auctions
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
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