Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
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Publication:2441227
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.001zbMath1284.91168OpenAlexW2130418032MaRDI QIDQ2441227
Publication date: 24 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.001
Related Items (3)
Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives
Cites Work
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- Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal Auction Design
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