Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.001zbMath1284.91168OpenAlexW2130418032MaRDI QIDQ2441227

Isabelle Brocas

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.11.001

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsmechanism designtype-dependent externalitiescountervailing incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Information acquisition and countervailing incentives

Cites Work

• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Coordination and externalities
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design

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