Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.007zbMath1232.91281OpenAlexW1966210300MaRDI QIDQ617590

Tanapong Potipiti, Bo Chen

Publication date: 21 January 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.06.007

zbMATH Keywords

retaliationWTOcountervailing externalitiesoptimal auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (3)

Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO ⋮ Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities

Cites Work

• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Auction Design
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Some Minimax Theorems.

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