Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities

DOI10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0zbMath1319.91085MaRDI QIDQ368060

Isabelle Brocas

Publication date: 18 September 2013

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0

zbMATH Keywords

auctions; mechanism design; type-dependent externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities, Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings, Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities, Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities

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