Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
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Publication:368060
DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9345-0zbMATH Open1319.91085OpenAlexW2097073495MaRDI QIDQ368060FDOQ368060
Authors: Isabelle Brocas 
Publication date: 18 September 2013
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0
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Cites Work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Efficient Auctions
- Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
- Coordination and externalities
- Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
- Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- On countervailing incentives
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Contracting with capacity constrained suppliers
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
Cited In (13)
- Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
- Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities
- Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
- Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
- Screening while controlling an externality
- Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
- The role of optimal threats in auction design
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