Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities

DOI10.1007/S11238-012-9345-0zbMATHOpenAlexMaRDI QIDQ368060FDO

Authors Isabelle Brocas

Publication date 18 September 2013

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9345-0

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionstype-dependent externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
• Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Auctions with cross-shareholdings
• Bidding for the future: Signaling in auctions with an aftermarket
• Contracting with capacity constrained suppliers
• Coordination and externalities
• Countervailing incentives in agency problems
• Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
• Efficient Auctions
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
• On countervailing incentives
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal licensing of cost-reducing innovation
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• The role of optimal threats in auction design

Cited in

(15)

• An assignment problem with interdependent valuations and externalities
• Incentives and implementation in allocation problems with externalities
• Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO
• Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
• Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
• Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
• Optimal allocation with costly inspection and discrete types under ambiguity
• Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mechanisms
• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
• Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
• Screening while controlling an externality
• Towards data auctions with externalities
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities

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