Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities

DOI10.1023/A:1026212810214MaRDI QIDQ1421768zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Isabelle Brocas

Publication date 3 February 2004

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026212810214

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionsCommitmentCoordinationExternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(7)

• The role of optimal threats in auction design
• Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities
• Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities
• Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities
• Nonparametric tests for strictly increasing virtual valuations
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Endogenous entry and exit in common value auctions

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