Endogenous entry and exit in common value auctions

DOI10.1023/A:1011432705173MaRDI QIDQ5959116zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors James C. Cox, Sam Dinkin, James T. Swarthout

Publication date 20 March 2002

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011432705173

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsbidding theoryexperimental economicsmarket equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation
• Theoretical and experimental analysis of auctions with negative externalities

Cited in

(9)

• A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition
• Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation
• Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
• An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: the blessed winner
• Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
• Continuous ascending vs. pooled multiple unit auctions
• Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
• Auctions with endogenous entry
• Two results on auctions with endogenous entry

This page was built for publication: Endogenous entry and exit in common value auctions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5959116)