Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
- Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
- Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Mid-auction information acquisition
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Participation constraints in the Vickrey auction
- Participation costs and efficient auctions
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
Cited in
(6)- Auctions with flexible entry fees: a note
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
- Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation
- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
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