Auction design with opportunity cost
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Publication:1003102
DOI10.1007/S00199-008-0331-2zbMATH Open1155.91368OpenAlexW2037075382MaRDI QIDQ1003102FDOQ1003102
Authors: George Jingfeng Lu 
Publication date: 26 February 2009
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0331-2
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Cites Work
Cited In (14)
- Contests with endogenous entry
- Manipulative auction design
- Informed entry in auctions
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Auctions with selective entry
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation
- Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry
- Second-price auctions with private entry costs
- Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed
- Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry
- On the optimal entry fee and reserve price for auctions with selective entry: a comment on Gentry, Li, Lu (2017)
- Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
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