Auction design with opportunity cost

DOI10.1007/s00199-008-0331-2zbMath1155.91368OpenAlexW2037075382MaRDI QIDQ1003102

George Jingfeng Lu

Publication date: 26 February 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0331-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (11)

Second-price auctions with sequential and costly participation ⋮ Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry ⋮ Second-price auctions with private entry costs ⋮ Auctions versus sequential mechanisms when resale is allowed ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ Equilibria in second-price auctions with private participation costs ⋮ Seller competition by mechanism design ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Why a simple second-price auction induces efficient endogenous entry ⋮ Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs ⋮ Contests with endogenous entry

Cites Work

• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal auctions revisited

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