Design of combinatorial auctions

zbMATH Open1126.91353MaRDI QIDQ3374081FDOQ3374081

Authors Sven De Vries, Rakesh V. Vohra 

Publication date 9 March 2006

zbMATH Keywords

revenue maximizationeconomic efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Combinatorial auction design
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• Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey
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Cited in

(12)

• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
• Auction design with opportunity cost
• Mechanism design for perturbation stable combinatorial auctions
• A new and improved design for multiobject iterative auctions
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time
• Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
• Combinatorial auction design
• Optimality and Efficiency in Auctions Design: A Survey
• MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
• Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions

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