MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS
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Publication:3161572
DOI10.1142/S0219622010004044zbMath1231.91128OpenAlexW1973297548MaRDI QIDQ3161572
Publication date: 15 October 2010
Published in: International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219622010004044
Related Items (3)
OPTIMAL MULTI-ATTRIBUTE AUCTIONS FOR DIVISIBLE GOODS ⋮ Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism ⋮ Incentive mechanism for allocating total permitted pollution discharge capacity and evaluating the validity of free allocation
Cites Work
- Auctioning divisible goods
- Erratum to ``The uniform price auction with endogenous supply [Econ. Lett. 88 (2005) 152-158]
- Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders
- When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
- PRICING FOR END-TO-END ASSURED BANDWIDTH SERVICES
- FUZZY GROUP DECISION MAKING MODEL BASED ON CREDIBILITY THEORY AND GRAY RELATIVE DEGREE
- Optimal Auction Design
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
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