When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions
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Publication:3413958
DOI10.1007/s10679-006-9003-xzbMath1142.91495OpenAlexW3124115591MaRDI QIDQ3413958
Jaime F. Zender, Orly Sade, Charles Schnitzlein
Publication date: 5 January 2007
Published in: Review of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10679-006-9003-x
Related Items (3)
MECHANISM DESIGN FOR OPTIMAL AUCTION OF DIVISIBLE GOODS ⋮ Risk aversion in share auctions: Estimating import rents from TRQs in Switzerland ⋮ Uniform price auctions and fixed price offerings in IPOs: An experimental comparison
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