Auction Design with a Revenue Target

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11zbMath1358.91060OpenAlexW2198628055MaRDI QIDQ3449588

Bo Tang, Paul W. Goldberg

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Cites Work

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• Sparse covers for sums of indicators
• The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
• Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
• Learning Poisson binomial distributions
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Efficiency-Revenue Trade-Offs in Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal competitive auctions
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Stochastic combinatorial optimization via poisson approximation

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