Auction design with a revenue target

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11zbMATH Open1358.91060OpenAlexW2198628055MaRDI QIDQ3449588FDOQ3449588

Authors: Paul W. Goldberg, Bo Tang 

Publication date: 4 November 2015

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11

Recommendations

• The complexity of optimal mechanism design
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• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Competitive auctions and digital goods
• Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
• Sparse covers for sums of indicators
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Optimal competitive auctions
• The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer
• Stochastic combinatorial optimization via Poisson approximation

Cited In (3)

• Expressive markets for donating to charities
• Revenue monotonicity under misspecified bidders
• Auction design with opportunity cost

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