Auction design with a revenue target

DOI10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11MaRDI QIDQ3449588zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul W. Goldberg, Bo Tang

Publication date 4 November 2015

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_11

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Computational difficulty of problems (lower bounds, completeness, difficulty of approximation, etc.) (68Q17)

Recommendations

• The complexity of optimal mechanism design
• Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

Cites work

• Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
• Competitive auctions and digital goods
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal competitive auctions
• Sparse covers for sums of indicators
• Stochastic combinatorial optimization via Poisson approximation
• The complexity of optimal multidimensional pricing for a unit-demand buyer

Cited in

(3)

• Expressive markets for donating to charities
• Revenue monotonicity under misspecified bidders
• Auction design with opportunity cost

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