Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.010MaRDI QIDQ2516248zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg

Publication date 12 August 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmsBayesian mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Mixed bundling auctions
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Pricing randomized allocations
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

Cited in

(19)

• Correlation-robust analysis of single item auction
• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
• Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
• Lookahead auctions with pooling
• Correlation-robust auction design
• Tight revenue gaps among simple mechanisms
• Incentive-compatible learning of reserve prices for repeated auctions
• Optimal deterministic auctions with correlated priors
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• Mechanism design for correlated valuations: efficient methods for revenue maximization
• Auction design with a revenue target
• Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders
• Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy
• Computing stable coalitions: approximation algorithms for reward sharing
• Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
• On optimal single-item auctions
• Derandomization of auctions
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions
• An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion

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