Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.03.010zbMATH Open1318.91089OpenAlexW2064345092MaRDI QIDQ2516248FDOQ2516248

Authors: Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg 

Publication date: 12 August 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010

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zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmsBayesian mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
• Bayesian and dominant-strategy implementation in the independent private-values model
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
• Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
• On optimal single-item auctions
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Mixed bundling auctions

Cited In (11)

• Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
• Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms
• Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing
• Derandomization of auctions
• Efficiency-revenue trade-offs in auctions
• Limitations of deterministic auction design for correlated bidders
• Lookahead auctions with pooling
• Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated Bidders
• An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
• Optimal search auctions with correlated bidder types
• Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions

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