Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010zbMath1318.91089MaRDI QIDQ2516248

Robert D. Kleinberg, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu

Publication date: 12 August 2015

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithms; Bayesian mechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms, Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011, Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions, Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

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