Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
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Publication:2516248
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010zbMath1318.91089OpenAlexW2064345092MaRDI QIDQ2516248
Robert D. Kleinberg, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu
Publication date: 12 August 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.03.010
Related Items (4)
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing ⋮ Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions ⋮ Tight Revenue Gaps Among Simple Mechanisms ⋮ Introduction to the special issue -- Algorithmic game theory -- STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011
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