Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations
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Publication:2455672
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Cites work
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Axiomatic characterization of the quadratic scoring rule
- Bayesian incentive compatible beliefs
- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- Correlated types and Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms with budget balance
- Dominant strategy mechanisms with mutually payoff-relevant private information and with public information
- Efficiency Despite Mutually Payoff-Relevant Private Information: The Finite Case
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3186512 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentive compatible mechanisms with full transferability
- Incentives and the existence of Pareto-optimal revelation mechanisms
- Incentives in Teams
- Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
- Linear inequality methods to enforce partnerships under uncertainty: An overview
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spaces
- On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- The Limits of ex post Implementation
- The relevance of private information in mechanism design
Cited in
(14)- The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
- Multi-dimensional procurement auction under uncertain and asymmetric information
- Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
- Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions
- A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
- Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders
- Multidimensional mechanism design in single peaked type spaces
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- Efficient sequential screening with informational externalities
- Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
- Mechanism design goes to war: Peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types
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