Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
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Publication:1757591
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.05.007zbMATH Open1419.91400OpenAlexW3121666339WikidataQ129857247 ScholiaQ129857247MaRDI QIDQ1757591FDOQ1757591
Authors: Yangwei Song 
Publication date: 15 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/58104/
Recommendations
Decision theory (91B06) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cited In (11)
- Collusion-proof mechanisms for full surplus extraction
- Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: an equivalence
- Maxmin implementation
- Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces
- Efficient assignment with interdependent values
- Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
- Ambiguous implementation: the partition model
- Strategic ambiguity in global games
- Public goods with ambiguity in large economies
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Robust contracting in general contract spaces
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