On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00278MaRDI QIDQ5477773zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel

Publication date 29 June 2006

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00278

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited in

(11)

• Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids
• Comparative efficiency of altruism and egoism as voting strategies in stochastic environment
• Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
• On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders
• Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
• Equilibrium competition, social welfare and corruption in procurement auctions
• Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
• Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions
• Information acquisition during a Dutch auction
• The insider's curse
• Auction design with costly preference elicitation

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