Auction design with costly preference elicitation

DOI10.1007/S10472-005-4692-YMaRDI QIDQ812389zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David C. Parkes

Publication date 23 January 2006

Published in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-005-4692-y

zbMATH Keywords

computational mechanism designincremental revelation principlemeta-deliberationpreference elicitationproxy agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Algorithmic mechanism design
• Algorithms - ESA 2003
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium
• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions
• Competitive bidding with entry costs
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547873 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966910 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information and the divergence between willingness to accept and willingness to pay
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Mid-auction information acquisition
• Models for iterative multiattribute procurement auctions
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions
• Participation costs and efficient auctions
• Preference elicitation and query learning
• Principles of metareasoning
• Sequential selling mechanisms
• The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices
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• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(13)

• Auction design with opportunity cost
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
• Optimal design of scoring auctions with multidimensional quality
• Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
• Computational complexity of some intelligent computing systems
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1966908 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning Theory
• Auction design without quasilinear preferences
• A characterization of the existence of succinct linear representation of subset-valuations
• Costly information providing in binary contests
• The private value single item bisection auction
• Vickrey-Dutch procurement auction for multiple items
• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations

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