Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2079341
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- Distributed greedy algorithm for multi-agent task assignment problem with submodular utility functions
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- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
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- Inapproximability results for combinatorial auctions with submodular utility functions
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