Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
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Cited in
(55)- Dynamic mechanism design
- A simple and fast algorithm for convex decomposition in relax-and-round mechanisms
- Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
- Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
- A preference-based, multi-unit auction for pricing and capacity allocation
- Generalized assignment problem: truthful mechanism design without money
- A universally-truthful approximation scheme for multi-unit auctions
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Truthfulness with value-maximizing bidders: on the limits of approximation in combinatorial markets
- Network pollution games
- Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
- An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions
- Welfare maximization with production costs: a primal dual approach
- New bounds for truthful scheduling on two unrelated selfish machines
- On black-box transformations in downward-closed environments
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Optimization with demand oracles
- The anarchy of scheduling without money
- Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms
- Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings
- Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions
- Cost sharing in two-sided markets
- New results for network pollution games
- Truthfulness and approximation with value-maximizing bidders
- Fast convex decomposition for truthful social welfare approximation
- Black-box reductions in mechanism design
- Single-parameter combinatorial auctions with partially public valuations
- Approximate truthful mechanism design for two-dimensional orthogonal knapsack problem
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Approximate composable truthful mechanism design
- Towards more practical linear programming-based techniques for algorithmic mechanism design
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6519655 (Why is no real title available?)
- Truthful Unification Framework for Packing Integer Programs with Choices
- Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
- Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design
- Truthful Mechanisms via Greedy Iterative Packing
- Primal beats dual on online packing LPs in the random-order model
- Algorithms as mechanisms: the price of anarchy of relax and round
- Towards more practical linear programming-based techniques for algorithmic mechanism design
- Separating the communication complexity of truthful and nontruthful algorithms for combinatorial auctions
- A $\frac{4}{3}$-Approximation Algorithm for the Minimum 2-Edge Connected Multisubgraph Problem in the Half-Integral Case
- Truthful mechanism design via correlated tree rounding
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2200715 (Why is no real title available?)
- Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms and Techniques
- Characterizing Truthful Multi-armed Bandit Mechanisms
- Mechanism design for the truthful elicitation of costly probabilistic estimates in distributed information systems
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7053320 (Why is no real title available?)
- Black-box reductions for cost-sharing mechanism design
- Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
- Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives
- Design and characterization of strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility game on a line
- Decomposing probability marginals beyond affine requirements
- Constant-factor approximation to deadline TSP and related problems in (almost) quasi-polytime
- Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity
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