Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement

DOI10.1007/S00291-020-00597-7MaRDI QIDQ2215560zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Martin Bichler, Zhen Hao, Richard Littmann, Stefan Waldherr

Publication date 13 December 2020

Published in OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7

zbMATH Keywords

Steiner tree problemapproximation mechanismdeferred-acceptance auctionnetwork procurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3677874 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1775413 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119672 (Why is no real title available?)
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• A faster approximation algorithm for the Steiner problem in graphs
• A note on finding the bridges of a graph
• A tabu search heuristic for the generalized minimum spanning tree problem
• Algorithmic Game Theory
• Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
• An algorithm composition scheme preserving monotonicity
• An improved LP-based approximation for Steiner tree
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• Computing and Combinatorics
• General network design: a unified view of combined location and network design problems
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Auction Design
• Reducibility among combinatorial problems
• Send-and-Split Method for Minimum-Concave-Cost Network Flows
• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Tighter Bounds for Graph Steiner Tree Approximation
• Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
• Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
• Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(2)

• The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• SteinLib
• GitHub

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