Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design
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Publication:2936982
Recommendations
- Optimal pricing in networks with externalities
- NETWORK EXTERNALITIES, DOMINANT VALUE MARGINS, AND EQUILIBRIUM UNIQUENESS
- Price of fairness on networked auctions
- An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
- Network externality and the coordination problem
- Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
- Optimal online pricing with network externalities
- Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges
- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
Cited in
(8)- Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
- Competitive auctions for markets with positive externalities
- Equilibrium pricing with positive externalities
- Technical note -- Revenue volatility under uncertain network effects
- Price of fairness on networked auctions
- Mechanism and network design with private negative externalities
- Towards data auctions with externalities
- Bayesian auctions with friends and foes
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