Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design
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Publication:2936982
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_11zbMATH Open1406.91187OpenAlexW2212207335MaRDI QIDQ2936982FDOQ2936982
Authors: Kamesh Munagala, Xiaoming Xu 
Publication date: 7 January 2015
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_11
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