An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective

DOI10.1007/s00199-007-0312-xzbMath1156.91356OpenAlexW2073603519MaRDI QIDQ1006569

Alexey Malakhov, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date: 25 March 2009

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0312-x

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingnetworksauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Stochastic network models in operations research (90B15) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Selling two identical objects ⋮ Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands ⋮ Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents ⋮ Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling ⋮ On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem ⋮ Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results

Cites Work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing

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