An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective

DOI10.1007/S00199-007-0312-XMaRDI QIDQ1006569zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexey Malakhov, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date 25 March 2009

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0312-x

zbMATH Keywords

linear programmingnetworksauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear programming (90C05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Stochastic network models in operations research (90B15)

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Cites work

• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Bundling and Optimal Auctions of Multiple Products
• Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Multi-Object Auctions
• The organization and scope of agents: Regulating multiproduct industries

Cited in

(16)

• Analysis of Decentralized Quantized Auctions on Cooperative Networks
• Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design
• An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
• Foundations of mechanism design: a tutorial. II. Advanced concepts and results
• Selling two identical objects
• On optimal mechanism design for a sequencing problem
• Randomized mechanism design for decentralized network scheduling
• Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings
• Optimal multi-unit mechanisms with private demands
• Auction design for the efficient allocation of service capacity under congestion
• Auctions versus private negotiations in buyer-seller networks
• Optimal and Efficient Auctions for the Gradual Procurement of Strategic Service Provider Agents
• Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach
• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• Rank-preserving multidimensional mechanisms: an equivalence between identical-object and heterogeneous-object models

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