Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
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Publication:2215560
DOI10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7zbMath1456.90096OpenAlexW3044331085MaRDI QIDQ2215560
Stefan Waldherr, Martin Bichler, Richard Littmann, Zhen Hao
Publication date: 13 December 2020
Published in: OR Spectrum (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7
Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Discrete location and assignment (90B80)
Uses Software
Cites Work
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