The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions

DOI10.1287/moor.2016.0835zbMath1386.91072OpenAlexW2600242401MaRDI QIDQ4595950

Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Gkatzelis

Publication date: 7 December 2017

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85524/1/mor-final.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

deferred-acceptance auctionssingle-parameter combinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (8)

Welfare Maximization with Deferred Acceptance Auctions in Reallocation Problems ⋮ Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms ⋮ Two-way greedy: algorithms for imperfect rationality ⋮ Modularity and greed in double auctions ⋮ Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement ⋮ Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. ⋮ Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains ⋮ Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains

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