The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions

DOI10.1287/MOOR.2016.0835MaRDI QIDQ4595950zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden

Publication date 7 December 2017

Published in Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/85524/1/mor-final.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

deferred-acceptance auctionssingle-parameter combinatorial auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
• Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions

Cited in

(8)

• Welfare maximization with deferred acceptance auctions in reallocation problems
• Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling.
• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Two-way greedy: algorithms for imperfect rationality
• Automated optimal OSP mechanisms for set systems. The case of small domains
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Multilateral deferred-acceptance mechanisms
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains

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