Modularity and greed in double auctions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2411517
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.008zbMath1415.91136OpenAlexW2731405383MaRDI QIDQ2411517
Tim Roughgarden, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Publication date: 24 October 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/83199/
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Software, source code, etc. for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-04)
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