scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406

MaRDI QIDQ4411372zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin

Publication date 8 July 2003

Full work available at URL http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2461/24610361.htm

zbMATH Keywords

basic auctionsprofit

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(16)

• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Competitive auctions
• Agent competition double-auction mechanism
• Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions
• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• Auctions with untrustworthy bidders
• On Behalf of the Seller and Society: Bicriteria Mechanisms for Unit-Demand Auctions
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Towards competitive equilibrium by double auctions
• Self serving reference points in double auctions
• Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
• STACS 2004
• Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches

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