scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1947406

zbMATH Open1046.91046MaRDI QIDQ4411372FDOQ4411372

Authors: Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin 

Publication date: 8 July 2003

Full work available at URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2461/24610361.htm

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

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zbMATH Keywords

profitbasic auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited In (16)

• Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders
• Truthful bundle/multiunit double auctions
• Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Self serving reference points in double auctions
• Dynamic double auctions: towards first best
• Agent competition double-auction mechanism
• Towards competitive equilibrium by double auctions
• Revenue maximization in a Bayesian double auction market
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches
• Competitive auctions
• Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
• On Behalf of the Seller and Society: Bicriteria Mechanisms for Unit-Demand Auctions
• Modularity and greed in double auctions
• Auctions with untrustworthy bidders
• STACS 2004

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